Those who defend negative theology base their ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS on God's unity, simplicity, being not comparable, lacking of limitation, lacking of quiddity, absoluteness, and infinity. On the other side, those who defend positive theology hold that there is no inconsistency between the above mentioned attributes of God and his positive attributes. For example, they say, we can accept both his unity of essence and his multiplicity of attributes. Also we can attribute him positively from one side and accept his incomparability from the other side. Also there is not any implication between having description and being limited. There is no inconsistency between an absolute God and the God of religions, All of these are derived from confusing general knowledge and detailed knowledge of God. We will discuss that most of these criticisms do not apply to negative theology and that the critics have not a clear concept of this theology in their minds.

From Avicenna's era up to now, various ARGUMENTS have been presented for the mental existence (al-wujud al-zihni), the most important of which are ten. These ARGUMENTS don' t have the same purpose: some of them are used only to reject the theory of relation (al-idafah), and some engage to refute the theory of phantoms (alashbah).Considering critically the ten ARGUMENTS, this article tries to show: (a) proving the mental existence for the mediate knowledge (al- ‘ilm al-husuli) is possible only through an extending premise; (b) two ARGUMENTS, i.e. the argument through assertion about non-existents (al- hukm ‘ala al-ma‘dumat) and the one through factual propositions (alqadaya al-haqiqiyyah), are sound only if they are based on the argument through ideating non-existents (tasawwur al-ma‘dumat); (c) the proofs of mental existence are mostly examples for the argument through ideating non-existents; (d) among the ten ARGUMENTS, only two, i.e. the argument through ideating non-existents and the one through misperception, are able to prove the mental existence, and the others are not sound.

In the history of philosophy, very few ARGUMENTS have grabbed the attention of intellectuals as strongly as ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS have. Graham Oppy, the contemporary Australian philosopher of religion, is an atheist who has considered different versions of ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS in order to uncover their weakness. In this paper, we deal with how Oppy has formulated ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS and what his objections to them are. The paper deploys an analytic method in order to elaborate Oppy’ s classification and objections. It turns out that there are several versions of what might be called the “ ONTOLOGICAL” argument. For Oppy, these ARGUMENTS are characterized by a priority. The most general objections leveled by Oppy at his 8 versions of the argument consist in: question begging, lack of epistemic value, denial of possible contradictions in case God does not externally exist, and inconceivability of an entity with infinite attributes. We conclude that given challenges of ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS for the existence of God, they fail to serve as ARGUMENTS for God, although Oppy’ s atheism and his conception of God and His attributes are not acceptable.

As many have said, “ethical criticism of art” has been the most enduring topic in the philosophy of art; but, in this broad topic, we must distinguish two problems: the first is the possibility of ethical criticism of artworks, and the second is the relevance of such criticism to the aesthetic value of artworks. In other words, the first problem is whether we can reasonably engage in ethical criticism of artworks or not, whereas the second problem is whether the ethical criticism of an artwork relates to the aesthetic criticism of it. This essay, however, is just about the second problem. To deal with the problem, we firstly divided the ARGUMENTS against ethical criticism of art into three divisions - ONTOLOGICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL, and methodological - and then, gathering the ARGUMENTS for the possibility of such criticism, from radical moralism to moderate autonomism and even “immoralism”, we attempted to meet the opponents and show that it can be reasonable to criticize ethically.

The imami-shi'i philosopher and theologian, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in his great and influential work, Tajrid al-iʿ tiqad, had advanced three ARGUMENTS for what is commonly called "intellectual moral good and bad" (husn wa qubh 'aqli). Two of these three ARGUMENTS are what we call respectively: "EPISTEMOLOGICAL argument" and "mutual-reverse argument". Both of the conclusions and premises of the ARGUMENTS are ambiguous and open to more than one interpretation. This paper separates EPISTEMOLOGICAL and ONTOLOGICAL aspects of each argument and after advancing their logical structures assess each one. On authors' opinion none of them can fulfill neither to prove the belief of people of justice ('Adliyya) nor invalidate their opponents' theory.

Metempsychosis is the concept of the transmigration of a human or animal soul into another human, animal, plant, or even an inanimate object. The theory of metempsychosis poses a challenge to the belief in resurrection (Maʿād), making it necessary to reject metempsychosis before proving Maʿād. Avicenna presents two ARGUMENTS against metempsychosis. The first argument, found in numerous works, rejects metempsychosis on the grounds that it requires the union of two souls within a single body. Avicenna alludes to the second argument in his Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat but postpones its full explanation to another unspecified work. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Fakhr al-Din Razi, and Qutb al-Din Razi have proposed different interpretations of this second argument. The variations in interpretation revolve around the number of implications Avicenna expressed for this modus ponendo and his reasons for rejecting them. Among these interpretations, only Qutb al-Din Razi's aligns more closely with Avicenna's original words. In the other two interpretations, there are either deficiencies or excesses compared to Avicenna's work.

Three unities are required traditionally in fulfillment on res judicata. In French Law, this condition is provided in art. 1351 of Civil Code. Despite this article, French cour de cassation in a judgment so called Cesareo in 2006, removed the unity of cause from the conditions of res judicata. Subsequently principle of concentration of ARGUMENTS (principe de concentration des moyens) was established in French Law. In Iranian Law, despite the fact that doctrine does not hesitate in necessity of unity of cause res judicata, in positive law there is no sign of this condition. Accordingly, Iranian Jurisprudence does not regard unity of cause as a necessary condition of res judicata. Creation of Principle of Concentration of ARGUMENTS in French law and subsequently, appearance of critical discussions about this principle, rendered an opportunity in Iranian Law to reconsidering the conditions of fulfillment of res judicata in positive law and jurisprudence?

Abolfazl Beyhaqi, no doubt, was a Sunni Muslim, but of what branch of it is open to question. In his Tarikh, there is such a strong belief in destiny that he appears as a fatalist. On the other hand, regarding the responsibility he believes his historical characters had, he does not seemingly deny free will. Moreover, wisdom and rationalism are widely praised there, while he considers the Mo’tazileh rationalists as foes of Islam as Zendiqs (atheists) and Dahris (materialists). So, what religion could it be called? It cannot be marked as Ash'ari because the Ash’aris do not agree with rationalism. They do not even consider distinguishing between the good and bad as a matter of rationalistic practice. They had commitment just to what the Shar’ (Divine Law) knows as good or bad. Besides, they were not in a politically good position until the Seljuk took power in about the latter half of the fifth century AH, while in the time when in Basrah and Baqdad, Ash’ari began to reform religious beliefs, in Samarqand district, Abu - Mansour Matoridi (died in 333 AH) emerged with the ideology close to that of Ash’ari’s. Due to the importance he gave to rationalism, of course not so much as Ash’ari did, he attracted Ash’ari’s students who defended his views as revival of perfect Sunni Religion. Abolfazl Beyhaqi praises Abu Hanifah in his Tarikh; since most Hanafis were Matoridis, he can be considered as “Matoridi”. The present article, comparing and contrasting some writings of Beihaqi with Ash’ari and Matoridi beliefs, brings up and studies the probablity of his being Matoridi.